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Abstract
In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the University of Erfurt was one
of the strongholds of the via moderna in Germany. The present article examines
how this school’s identity was manifested in discussions on the soul and its
powers, engaged in by three Erfurtian philosophers: Johannes Carnificis de
Lutrea, Jodocus Trutfetter and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen. In the various
forms of their expositions these authors reveal a rather uniform stance
concerning doctrinal issues. Their positions are largely based on the tradition of
t h e via moderna going back to the early fifteenth century, and their
argumentation is deeply bound to the problems arising from this school’s
position. Comparisons with concurrent Thomist and Scotist sources show that
the Erfurtians describe the positions of other schools in an appropriate manner,
although the arguments for and against these positions are often borrowed from
the authorities of their own school rather than from contemporaneous discussion.
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1. Introduction
As we may see from the records of the famous Erfurtian collection of medieval
manuscripts, the Bibliotheca Amploniana, almost every major western
commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul was already to be found in Erfurt by the
early fifteenth century.1  Several new commentaries were also written, many of
which still exist in manuscript form. These include commentaries by Henricus
Toke of Brema2,  Johannes Nayl of Wartburg3, Johannes of Zelandia4 and the
Exercitium circa libros de anima5, which originates from Erfurt and has been
attributed to Henricus of Hildesheim.6
1 Both the university library and the Amplonian collection consisted of a
considerable amount of items. See Erich Kleineidam, Universitas Studii
Erffordensis I (Leipzig, 19852), 361–3.
2 Tractatus de anima (1414), Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, cms 1374, ff. 25r–
78v. See Erich Kleineidam, Universitas I, 290.
3 Quaestiones super I–III libros ‘De anima’ Aristotelis,Vienna, Stiftsbibliothek
des Schottenklosters cms 301/241, ff. 116r–196r. Johannes became a master of
arts in 1398, and taught in the arts faculty until the 1430s. See Mieczyslaw
Markowski, ‘Die ersten philosophischen Strömungen an der Erfurter Universität
im Licht des Aristoteles-Handschriften’ in Bibliotheca Amploniana. Ihre
Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus, Nominalismus und
Humanismus, ed. Andreas Speer. Miscellanea Mediaevalia 23 (Berlin, 1995),
33–4. 
4 Quaestiones super I–III libros ‘De anima’ Aristotelis (1425), Vienna,
Stiftsbibliothek des Schottenklosters cms 301/241, ff. 197va–223r, 227v. See
Markowski, Die ersten, 43.
5 Halle UB, cms Y. g. Qu 30, 70r-143v. See Kleineidam, Universitas I, 143, fn.
788; Markowski, Die ersten, 37; Charles Lohr, ‘Medieval Latin Aristotle
Commentaries’ in Traditio 30 (1974), 137.
6 To these should perhaps be added a commentary on De anima (München UB
3Having such a remarkable resource of Aristotelian psychology, Erfurt
was also one of the strongholds of the late medieval school of the via moderna.
As the alma mater of the young Martin Luther, the university has also received
attention as the scholastic context of the Lutheran Reformation. Therefore, for
the study of the development of Aristotelian psychology in the early sixteenth
century, Erfurt provides an interesting case for the observation of the importance
of school identities for the teaching of Aristotelian psychology on the threshold
of the Renaissance and the Reformation.
The present study inquires into the commentaries of Aristotelian
psychology which were published between 1482 and 1517 and which are
available only in printed form. The first to be printed was the Exercitium
librorum de anima by Johannes Carnificis of Lutrea (Kaiserslautern) (d.  1479)
who was a licentiate of theology from Erfurt and later archdeacon of Mainz.7
Lutrea’s commentary was later succeeded by several expositions on natural
cms Fol. 567, ff. 122r–192v; clm 6971, ff. 158ra–194vb) which is attributed to
Johannes Rucherat of Wesel. See Markowski, Die ersten, 49. See also Bernd
Michael, Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Wirken und zur
Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1985), 353 for
two additional commentaries related to the university of Erfurt. 
7 Johannes Carnificis de Lutrea, Exercitium librorum de anima (Erfurt, 1482). As
archdeacon, Lutrea was made to participate in the judicial process against his
former colleague Johannes Rucherat of Wesel, who was accused of heretical
teaching.  In addition to his De anima commentary, printed in Erfurt
posthumously in 1482 by Paulus Wider de Hornbach, a collection of sermons
and a description of a Mainzer synod in 1472 have survived from his writings.
Some correspondence between Lutrea and Johannes of Wesel has also survived,
and  has been edited by Gerhard Ritter. On Lutrea’s life and writings see
Kleineidam, Universitas Studii Erffordensis II (Leipzig, 19922),  312; Joachim
O t t , Die Handschriften des ehemaligen Fraterherrenstifts St. Markus zu
Butzbach in der Universitätsbibliothek Giessen, part 2 (Giessen, 2004), 271–2.
4philosophy, which regularly also included a section on philosophical psychology.
These were written by two authors, Jodocus Trutfetter of Eisenach and
Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen.
Jodocus Trutfetter (d. 1519) was probably the most respected Erfurt
philosopher of his time. His major work was a large textbook of logic, the
Summule totius logice.8 Apart from other works on logic, he, being already a
doctor of theology, also published late in life a textbook on natural philosophy,
the Summa in totam physicen, whose eighth book deals with Aristotle’s De
anima and Parva naturalia.9
Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen, usually called Usingen after his
birthplace, was Trutfetter’s younger colleague at the Faculty of Arts. He
published textbooks solely on philosophy until 1516, and thereafter several
theological treatises. Like Trutfetter, he attained a doctor’s degree in theology,
but only after joining the Order of the Augustinian Hermits. Most of his works
on natural philosophy include a section on psychology, and one of these was
reprinted as late as 1543 to be used in the teaching of natural philosophy in
Erfurt.10
After a few introductory remarks on available textual sources on
8 Jodocus Trutfetter, Summule totius logice (Erfurt, 1501).
9 On Trutfetter’s life and works see Kleineidam, Universitas Studii Erffordensis
II, 153–4; 290–2; Josef Pilvousek, ‘Jodocus Trutfetter’ in Große Denker Erfurts
und der Erfurter Universität, ed. Dietmar von der Pfordten (Göttingen, 2002),
96–117.
10 On Usingen, see Kleineidam, Universitas II, 298–301;154–7; Sebastian Lalla,
Secundum viam modernam. Ontologischer Nominalismus bei Bartholomäus
Arnoldi von Usingen. (Würzburg, 2003), 15–22.
5psychology in late medieval Erfurt, I will delineate some of the formative
elements of the identity of the via moderna in an Erfurtian context. The Erfurt
authors of the period professed themselves to be adherents of the via moderna.
However, they also discussed the opinions of other schools of thought in their
works. My main objective will be to show to what degree the local tradition of
t h e via moderna determined the Erfurtians’ positions in the the material
discussing psychology as a science as well as some general issues concerning the
soul. I will also compare their ideas with certain concurrent Thomist and Scotist
authors dealing with the same subjects. This, I think, will enable us to see more
clearly the distinctive contribution of the Erfurt via moderna to psychology in
the early sixteenth century German context.
2. Sources
The earliest printed work for the teaching of psychology written in Erfurt was
Johannes of Lutrea’s Exercitium in libros Aristotelis de anima from 1482. It is
not clear what period of time its contents reflect, since its author had died
already in 1472 and his teaching activity could have taken place anytime
between his graduation as a master of arts in 1456 and his becoming a licentiate
of theology and archdeacon in 1466. Nor can a possible redaction of the
commentary by a second hand be ruled out. A similar type of work was
published in 1507 by Bartholomaeus of Usingen (Exercitium de anima).11
Formally, the two exercitia are nearly identical. They both consist of
11 Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen, Exercitium de anima (Erfurt, 1507).
6questions which are treated according to a uniform pattern: 1. title of the
question; 2. a varying number of notanda, where terminological divisions and
definitions are presented; 3. answers to the questions followed by conclusions
and their proofs; 4. arguments against the conclusions and their responses. In the
fourth part there is a minor difference between Lutrea and Usingen: the former
posits the responses directly after the individual arguments, whereas the latter
gathers the arguments and responses into small groups. Both exercitia announce
which passage of Aristotle’s De anima the questions are related to. Lutrea does
this only by short notices at the beginning of the individual questions. Usingen is
more systematic: he adds the division of books and tracts in the headings, and
also gives short summaries of Aristotle’s text before examining individual
questions. Regarding the contents of the questions, significant differences exist.
As a general notion one could say that the number of counter-arguments in
Usingen’s exercitium is considerably higher than in Lutrea’s work.12 In order to
elucidate the position of the via moderna in Lutrea’s and Usingen’s
commentaries it is helpful to compare them with a similar treatise from an author
of a different philosophical school. In his Cursus philosophicus, Erasmus
Friesner of Wunsiedel  provides us with a fairly contemporaneous example of a
12 A similar pattern of questions was used already in early fifteenth century
Erfurt, as may be seen from two Erfurt commentaries on Metaphysics edited by
Andrea Tabarroni. See Thuonis de Vibergia opera, ed. Andrea Tabarroni  and
Sten Ebbesen (Copenhagen, 1998), XIX; Andrea Tabarroni, ‘Henricus Ruyn,
Disputata Metaphysicae. An Edition’ in Université de Copenhague cahiers de
l’institut du moyen-age grec et latin 61 (1991), 185–428. On the literary genre of
exercises, see Olga Weijers, La ’disputatio’ dans les Facultés des arts au moyen
âge (Turnhout, 2002), 312–3.
7Thomist commentary of a similar kind.13
Besides the exercitia there is yet other, but more variant, type of
commentary, called compendium, which includes roughly all other expositions
where the contents of the De anima are treated in Erfurt. It has been suggested
that these emerged out of the need of ever younger generations of students to
fully understand the difficult lectures on Aristotle’s natural philosophy.14 
Usingen’s Parvulus philosophie naturalis from the year 1499 is formally
a commentary on an earlier treatise of a similar title, written probably by the
early fifteenth century author Peter Gerticz of Dresden; Usingen added his own
commentary in the midst of Peter’s text printed in boldface.15  The work
consisted of three parts (tractatus): two on physics and one on the soul. This
would mean that it was written for baccalaureate studies, because the areas
required for the master’s level were missing.16 
13 Erasmus Friesner de Wunsiedel, Cursus philosophicus (Frankfurt, 1509). As
an example of a Scotist set of questions, Jan ze Stobnicy’s Parvulus philosophie
naturalis, cum expositione textuali ac dubiorum magis necessariorum
dissolutione ad intentionem Scoti congesta in studio Cracoviensi (Basel, 1516;
first publication in Cracow in 1507) although formally a compendium, will be
used below. On Stobnicy, see ‘Jan ze Stobnicy (1470-1518 lub 1519)’, in 700 lat
myśli polskiej. Filozofia i myśl społeczna XIII-XV wieku, ed. J. Domański,
(Warszawa, 1978), 477–8.
14 Kleineidam, Universitas II, 155–6.
15 Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen, Parvulus philosophie naturalis (Leipzig,
1499). Peter of Dresden’s Parvulus philosophiae naturalis was a concise
exposition of the main contents of Aristotelian natural philosophy. On Peter of
Dresden’s treatise and Usingen’s use of it, see Lalla, Secundum, 77–86.
16 It has been maintained that Peter of Dresden’s Parvulus was widely used in the
city schools, so that there would be a continuity with the material used already
before academic studies.  It cannot be determined if it was intended that the
graduated masters would be so equipped to lecture on Peter of Dresden’s
Parvulus in the schools. See Kleineidam, Universitas II, 156.
8For the purpose of comparison it is fortunate that another commentary on
Peter of Dresden’s Parvulus has survived, also printed in Leipzig in 1499,
namely Johannes Peyligk’s Philosophiae naturalis compendium. Whereas
Usingen had written his textbook in the spirit of the Erfurtian via moderna,
Peyligk, who was active in Leipzig, followed Thomas Aquinas and Giles of
Rome instead.17 In addition to Usingen and Peyligk, a further example of the
Parvulus genre of commentaries will be used below, the Parvulus philosophie
naturalis by the Krakow Scotist Jan ze Stobnicy. This commentary provides us
with a contemporaneous Scotist perspective on Peter of Dresden’s Parvulus and
is therefore helpful in differentiating the positions of the main philosophical
schools of the time.18
Usingen also published another exposition of the De anima, which was
included as a part of his Compendium naturalis philosophie (Erfurt, 1505–7). It
deals with subject matter broader than what the Parvulus deals with, and
contains tracts of the De generatione et corruptione, Meteora and De somno et
vigilia, among others, which were used in the master’s studies.  On the other
hand, it contained only elucidations of terms and the divisions of their different
meanings; the large questions present in the Parvulus are missing.  This may be
partly due to the fact that in 1507 Usingen published his Exercitium de anima,
17 Johannes Peyligk, Philosophiae naturalis compendium (Leipzig, 1499).
Usingen’s commentary was printed by Erfurtian Bachelor of Arts Wolfgang
Stöckel on the 23rd of February and Peyligk’s by Melchior Lotter on the 12th of
September.
18 Stobnicy, Parvulus.
9which consisted solely of questions.19 
 Trutfetter’s Summa in totam physicen resembles for the most part the
form of Usingen’s Parvulus, being made up of lecture text and questions. There
are still traces of the text of the Parvulus philosophie naturalis by Peter of
Dresden, printed in boldface type, but one cannot consider it a commentary in
the proper sense. The scope of the textbook is not restricted to the Physics and
De anima, as the topics discussed in master’s studies are covered also. In several
cases Trutfetter describes various opinions on the matters, although the main
purpose of his handbook (epitome) is to describe “in a simple manner of
exposition and in a plain style the position of those who are called
nominalists.”20 
3. Authorities and school identity
The University of Erfurt in the late Middle Ages represented the tradition of the
via moderna. Despite the obvious freedom of their conception of the via
moderna, the academics of Erfurt professed themselves largely as teachers of
this school.21 Central to the via moderna in Erfurt were from the beginning two
notions above all: the rejection of the realism of universals and rejection of the
plurality of substantial forms in the same subject. These doctrines were
19 On different versions of Usingen’s compendium of natural philosophy, see
Lalla, Secundum, 87; 402–4; 408–9.
20 Jodocus Trutfetter, Summa in totam physicen (Erfurt, 1514), f. a5r.
21 Kleineidam, Universitas I, 179–89.
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prescribed at least for the members of the collegium Porta coeli in the statutes
written by Amplonius Rating of Bercka, the founder of this influential
collegium. These were mentioned together with the rejection of the Hussite
heresy, to which the notion of universal realism was apparently seen to be
connected. Yet the realism was defined as “the Platonists present it”, which left a
certain vagueness to the formulation. Amplonius also recommended that the
scholars take into account, in addition to the “modernos”, such teachers as Albert
the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Alexander of Hales and Henry of
Ghent.22
From such writers as Johannes Rucherat of Wesel and Johannes of Lutrea
we find more specific descriptions of the status of universals, and these writers
also affirm unequivocally the unity of the substantial form.23 For Johannes of
Wesel the rejection of realism implied that there is no res universale; rather, a
universal is an concept formed in a created mind to represent many singular
entities in the world. To Wesel, universal concepts represented the objects of
cognition in such an imperfect and confused manner that he would not accept
that such universals exist as ideas of species or genera in the divine mind.24
22 Kleineidam, Universitas I, 182–3.
23 On the question of the unity of the substantial form, see Hans-Ulrich Wöhler,
‘Der Nominalismus des Johannes Rucherat von Wesel’, in Bibliotheca
Amploniana. Ihre Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus,
Nominalismus und Humanismus, ed. Andreas Speer. Miscellanea Mediaevalia 23
(Berlin, 1995),  378 fn. 54; Lutrea, Ex., ff. 21r–2v.
24 On Wesel’s nominalism in general, see Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 367–80.
“Quantum ad quartum articulum sciendum: secundum viam modernam nullae
sunt res nisi singulares et universalia non sunt nisi entia fabricata in anima
creata, quibus multae confuse et imperfecte intelliguntur et repraesentantur,
quare in divina mente non est ponere tales universales cogitationes propter
11
However, he does not reject the notion of ideas in God altogether: God has ideas
of creatures, since the divine essence “represents all things, which have been
produced by God insofar as they imitate the divine essence.” 25 Even these ideas
are distinct from each other merely on the basis of their differences in the human
mind. In the divine mind there are no principles of diversity between ideas.
However, the universal concepts are not ƒicta without any correspondence to the
external world, insofar as their referents are singular beings, which are conceived
in a universal manner, viz. without their individuating properties.26 Lutrea
expressed basically the same conviction by stating that there is no universale in
essendo, that all entities are singular in their being, although there are universals
in the sense of universal terms or mental concepts, that is to say universales in
significando.27
imperfectionem; quare etiam non videntur ponendae ideae in mente divina
specierum et generum. Sed solum ideae sunt singularium rerum producibilium a
divina essentia.” Cited according to Kleineidam, Universitas II, 23 fn. 173. See
also Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 371 fn. 20.
25 Johannes Rucherat de Wesalia, Lectura Ioannis de Wesalia super Primum,
Secundum et Tertium Sentantiarum cum Kiliano super quartum, Berlin,
Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Ms. Theol. Lat. Fol. 97, f. 80va:
“...ideo sequitur quod idea nihil aliud sit quam essentia divina inquantum ipsa est
repraesentativa omnium quae producibilia sunt a deo tamquam imitantia ipsam
essentiam divinam.” Cited according to Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 375 fn. 41.
26 Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 371. 
27 Lutrea, Ex., ff. 10v; 11v. Whether or not there are such universals in the divine
mind is not clear to Lutrea. He seems to endorse a position similar to that of
Wesel’s according to which the divine mind is one simple idea of created things,
so that the diversity of ideas of singular beings is not in a proper sense attributed
to the divine mind. See Lutrea, Ex., f. 52r: “Et sic deus primo intelligit se et in
hoc quod intelligit se, tunc invenit similitudines et ideas omnium alium rerum,
quia essentia divina est idea omnium rerum, ex eo quia in causa semper est idea
rei causatae, modo essentia divina est causa omnium aliarum rerum.” Both
Wesel’s and Lutrea’s wording seem to imply that they were attributing the ideas
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In the works of Jodocus Trutfetter we find a most detailed account of
what models of thought the nominalist position on universals excludes. He
makes it explicit that “our position” is that of the nominalists (nominales),
according to which there is no universality in things themselves, and it is only
signs which have this property. Contrary views, which he describes largely
following Ockham’s criticism in 1 Sent. d. 2, are to be labelled as the positions
of the realists (realistas).28 Like Wesel, Trutfetter rejects the extreme version of
nominalism, according to which universals were only “ficta, without any
correspondence in the things (sine rei respondentia).” This does not imply, as
some of the realist critics would maintain, that the nominalist position as such
would be untenable or that there should be any real communicability in beings.
Trutfetter’s most severe criticism is directed against views which seem to imply
any kind of real communicability of universal natures. According to him, the
idea of a real unity of universal natures is connected to the Hussite heresy, which
the Church had condemned at the Council of Constance. This remark reveals that
to the divine mind as Marsilius Inghen did, rather than attributing them to
creatures (as known by the divine mind) as did Ockham. On the difference
between Ockham’s and Marsilius’ positions, see Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen,
Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought (Leiden,
1993), 153–6. See also Wöhler (Der Nominalismus, 375–7), who argues for
Ockham’s influence, but does not discuss Marsilius’ view. On Marsilius’
influence on Wesel, see Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 379 and on metaphysics in
Erfurt before Wesel, see E. P. Bos, ‘Thuo of Viborg and Marsilius of Inghen’, in
Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of the symposium ‘The
Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy’ January 10–13, 1996, ed. S.
Ebbesen and R. L. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), 523–39.
28 Trutfetter, Veteris artis, ff. A4r-v; Summule, f. D2v. On Ockham’s criticism,
see Matthias Kaufmann, Referenz und Wahrheit bei Wilhelm von Ockham
(Leiden, 1994), 55.
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the question of universals was for the Erfurtians a matter of a particular scholarly
tradition rather than a topic open to philosophical discussion.29 
The only plausible way to posit universal natures in the extramental
world would be, according to Trutfetter, to interpret individual natures as
universal in a weaker sense, that their universality is not realized until the
intellect recognizes them as universal. The Scotist view, which posits a common
intention in the things themselves, could be tolerated if the common intention
was to be understood merely to mean that there is some objective principle in the
singular substance of its being known as a universal nature, and that this
principle resides in the thing itself prior to any operation of the intellect.30 The
Thomist view, however, seems for Trutfetter not liable to err. Trutfetter describes
it as something which does not posit universal natures that are really or formally
distinct from individuals in the extramental world, but rather where universal
natures are only rationally distinguished through the operation of the intellect.31 
29 Trutfetter, Summule, ff. D2v–D3r; D5r. Wesel had already explicitly rejected
such an idea of universal natures. See Wöhler, Der Nominalismus, 371. The
appeal to the condemnation of Wyclif was not unusual in the Wegestreit. See
Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, ‘Via antiqua and via moderna in the Fifteenth Century:
Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the Wegestreit’, in The
Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, ed. L.
Nielsen and R. Friedman (Dordrecht, 2003), 20–2. However, Trutfetter’s
intention does not seem to be only polemical, since he refers also to Thomist
writers, who deny the real communicability of beings.
30 Trutfetter, Summule, f. Drr: “Haec si intelliguntur, quod in re ipsa ex sua natura
ante omnem intellectus operationem sit ratio obiectiva intentionis communis, sic
quod res ipsa ex natura sua possit communiter vel concipi et respondere huic
communi intentioni, tolerari possunt, si modo sane intelligantur.” See also
Trutfetter, Summule, ff. D4r–D5r; Veteris artis, f. A4v. Trutfetter mentions
Scotus himself and the Scotist Antonius Andreae as proponents of this view.
31 Trutfetter, Veteris artis, f. A4r-v: “Caeteris visum est naturam, quae aliquo
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It is worth noting that Trutfetter’s analysis accommodates two major
traditions of the rivalling realist schools, the Thomist and the Scotist; these are
accepted within orthodox Christian doctrine without endorsing their positions as
such. On the Thomist view he even notes that it does not differ substantially
from the nominalist view, and that the differences consist of the mode of
speaking and the use of some terms. It remains as the main difference that
whereas the Thomists attribute universality to things in the manner described
above, the nominalists attribute it only to signs.32
modo et incomplete est universalis, esse realiter in singularibus, nec realiter sed
ratione solum et consideratione intellectus ab illis distingui, ita quod eadem res
secundum esse suum est singularis et secundum esse intellectus universalis, vel
ut alii dicunt, sub uno conceptu universalem et alio singularem, cum quibus
sentit Thomas Aquinas ut diximus.” See also Trutfetter, Summule, ff. D2v-D3r;
D5r-D6v. Trutfetter’s knowledge concerning Thomist views depends, in addition
to Aquinas himself, on a number of sources. He explicitly names Durandus of
Saint-Pourçain, Peter of Palude, Thomas Sutton, Bernardus Lombardi, Hervaeus
Natalis, Petrus Niger, Guilhelmus de Maricalmo, Johannes Capreoli and even
Robert Holcot as proponents of this view; perhaps he also has Silvester Prierias
in mind (cf. the list of sources in Trutfetter, Summule, f. A4r-v). Trutfetter refers
to Aquinas’ De ente et essentia as well as his tractates on universals. On
Aquinas’ view in the De ente et essentia, see L. J. Elders, The Metaphysics of
Being of St. Thomas Aquinas (Leiden, 1993), 211.
32 Trutfetter, Summule, f. D6v: “Quibus dilucide sequitur inter sententiam
Thomae Aquinatis et recentiorum philosophorum, quos modernos vocamus, in
hac re nullam fere esse diversitatem, sed solum in modo loquendi et usu
quorundam terminorum. Nam quod ille attribuit rei ex modo considerandi, hi
magis proprietati sermonis, intendentes signo rem tali modo significanti,
attribuunt. Nam ut ille rem sub una consideratione singularem et alia
universalem appellat, sic hi signum sub eiusmodi consideratione significans.”
Usingen seems to understand the Thomist and Scotist positions in a similar
manner, endorsing the favourable interpretation of the Scotist position. See
Usingen, Summa compendiaria totius logice, (Basel, 1507), f. c7v. On Usingen’s
position in general, see Lalla, Secundum, 278–85. On the problems of Usingen’s
conceptualist position and its consequences for his semantics, see Lalla,
Secundum, 357–370.
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Concerning Erfurtians’ teaching of philosophical psychology, their most
evident background is to be found in the Buridanian tradition of natural
philosophy. This can be clearly seen even in the earliest of our sources, Lutrea’s
Exercitium. Its titles of the questions correspond to other similar collections
following the example of Buridan’s Questiones de anima. The same applies to
Usingen’s Exercitium de anima.33
It is not easy to point out which of the question commentaries among the
Buridanians had a direct influence on Lutrea and Usingen. One cannot reject the
possibility of a continuous Buridanian tradition of exercitia in fifteenth century
Erfurt. In fact, many early fifteenth century manuscripts of the De anima
commentaries from Erfurt have survived and some of their titles suggest that
they are formally question commentaries like  Lutrea’s and Usingen’s exercitia.34
Even when Buridan’s direct influence is not evident, one may count his
Questiones de anima as one of the works which have, at least indirectly,
influenced these two exercitia.35 Among later authors who belong to the
Buridanian tradition of questiones de anima, only Lawrence of Lindores is
33 On the importance of Buridan to the teaching of philosophy in Erfurt, see
Michael, Johannes Buridan, 349–53.
34 Cf. the two early Quaestiones super I–III libros “De anima” Aristotelis and
Exercitium circa libros de anima mentioned above in footnote 3 and 5.
35 In what follows, if not noted otherwise, I shall refer to the questions of
Buridan’s third and final lecture on the De anima (=QDA3) edited in: Peter
Gordon Sobol, John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation. An Edition of  Book II
of His Commentary on Aristotle’s Book on the Soul with an Introduction and a
Translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species. (Diss. Indiana University, 1984)
and John Alexander Zupko, John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and
Translation of Book III of His ‘Questions of Aristotle’s De Anima’ (Third
Redaction), with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays (Diss.
Cornell University, 1989). 
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explicitly mentioned by Usingen.36 Lutrea does not refer to Lawrence’s views in
the corresponding passages, although he also mentions the same author in a
place where Usingen does not.37 Lutrea is also missing a question found in
Lawrence (“Utrum quelibet pars quantitativa animalis sit animal”), which
appears in Usingen’s Exercitium.38 This would imply that Usingen relies more
heavily than Lutrea on Lawrence’s Quaestiones de anima, although it was no
novelty in his time and had been available in Erfurt since the early fifteenth
century.39 It is interesting to note that the question  “Utrum quelibet pars
quantitativa animalis sit animal” appears again in Trutfetter’s Summa, although
he never mentions Lawrence of Lindores by name.40
A number of references to earlier authors in Lutrea’s and Usingen’s
exercitia may be plausibly traced back to Buridan‘s Questiones de anima as their
immediate source.  These would include numerous references to the Arabic
philosophers, mainly Averroës and Avicenna, and further, references to Albert
36 Usingen, Ex. an., f. H3v. The context of this reference suggests that it refers to
Lindores’s commentary on De anima.
37 Lutrea, Ex., f. 38v, where Lindores is mentioned sharing the position of the
Arabic philosopher Avempace (Ibn-Bajja).
38 Usingen, Ex. an., ff. E6v–F1v.
39 See Wilhelm Schum, Beschreibendes Verzeichniss der Amplonianischen
Handschriftensammlung zu Erfurt (Berlin, 1887), manuscript no. 343, which is
an Erfurtian copy of Lindores’s Quaestiones dating from the year 1436.
40 For an analysis of the question in Trutfetter’s Summa, see Pekka Kärkkäinen,
‘Nature and Individual in Jodocus Trutfetter’s ‘Summa in totam physicen’’, in
Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter, ed. Jan A. Aertsen und Andreas Speer.
Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26 (Berlin, 1998), 824–8. On the treatment of the
question by Lutrea, Usingen and Trutfetter, see also Pekka Kärkkäinen, ‘On the
Semantics of ‘Human Being’ and ‘Animal’ in early 16th Century Erfurt’,
Vivarium 42 (2004), 237–56.
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the Great and Thomas Aquinas.41
Apart from the Buridanian background, which forms the basis of the
exercitia, is a growing number of other authors whose works have obviously had
some influence. First of all, the general influence of Albert the Great should be
mentioned. This was mediated above all through the compendia on natural
philosophy. The most important of these was the Historia naturalium or
Philosophia pauperum, as it was also called. This exposition of natural
philosophy although attributed to Albert the Great, was compiled out of Albert’s
writings on natural philosophy apparently by another author. This tract did not
have a direct influence in Erfurt, as it did in several other German universities in
the late Middle Ages. However, it served as a basis for the Parvulus philosophie
naturalis by Peter Gertitz from Dresden, to which Usingen published a
commentary in 1499. It also appears that later expositions on natural philosophy
extracted their basic text more or less from the Parvulus, modifying it to fit the
requirements of the nominalist doctrines. As well, the Tractatus de anima by
Pierre d’Ailly, which is not infrequently referred to by Usingen, used the pseudo-
Albertinian Historia naturalium as a source.42
41 The use of such authors as Albert, Aquinas and Giles of Rome (among others)
in addition to the nominalist position was prescribed to the masters by the status
of the Porta coeli (see footnote 22 above for reference). Tabarroni and Ebbesen
criticize the view supported by Kleineidam that the impact of these prescriptions
was decisive in the works of the early collegiates Heinrich of Runen and Thuo of
Viberg. See Kleineidam, Universitas I, 182; 185; Andrea Tabarroni,
‘Introduction’ and Sten Ebbesen, ‘Introduction’ in Thuonis de Vibergia opera
(Copenhagen, 1998), XX; XXXII.
42See Katherine Park, ‘Albert’s Influence on Late Medieval Psychology’, in
Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. James A.
Weisheipl. Studies and Texts 49 (Toronto, 1980), 521; Olaf Pluta, Die
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Furthermore, in the Parvulus Usingen refers to certain theological works
that were not mentioned in Lutrea’s Exercitium. Among these, the Sentences
commentaries of Ockham and Gregory of Rimini as well as Ockham’s
Quodlibeta also belong to the sources of Pierre d’Ailly’s Tractatus. Biel’s
Collectorium in quattuor libros Sententiarum, which was not printed until 1501,
was referred to for the first time in the Exercitium in 1507, when Usingen
utilized it rather extensively.43
In the latest of the sources, Summa in totam physicen, Trutfetter uses
almost all the authors mentioned in the earlier expositions by Lutrea and
Usingen, and among these the importance of Biel’s Collectorium  cannot be
overestimated. In addition to this, he refers to a number of works not mentioned
by Lutrea or Usingen. These include a medical work, Conciliator differentiarum
philosophorum et medicorum by the Italian Pietro d’Abano; works of the
Augustinian theologian Alfonso Vargas of Toledo;  and a contemporary
compendium of philosophy, Margarita philosophica, by Georg Reisch. Trutfetter
was even aware of the latest developments in the Church, and could thus in 1514
philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly, Bochumer Studien zur
Philosophie 6 (Amsterdam, 1987), 30–1.
43 See, for example, Usingen, Parvulus, ff. 83r; 86v; 95r. In the Exercitium
Usingen refers even to Diogenes Laertius, whose works were available in Latin
first through Renaissance translations. See Usingen, Ex. an., f. Q1r. In his
question in the quodlibetal disputation in 1497, which was printed as an
appendix to Parvulus, Usingen quotes several authors who do not appear in the
rest of his works. These include Paul of Venice, Thomas of Strasbourg, Marsilio
Ficino, Petrus Nigri and John Rucherat of Wesel. See Usingen, Questio de
quiditate quantitatis continue in disputatione de quolibet Erffordie A. D. 1497
determinata, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wöhler in Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch
für Antike und Mittelalter  6 (2001), 162; 167; 180.
19
refer to the latest decrees of the ongoing Fifth Lateran Council.44
4. Psychology and the soul in general
4.1. Psychology as a part of natural science
The Erfurt nominalists Lutrea and Usingen discuss the science of the soul in the
initial questions of their exercitia. Their position is that as a natural science,
scientia de anima concerns knowledge of singular extramental entities called
souls, since natural philosophy is about res, and logic is about signs. However,
scientia de anima also consists partly of knowledge of signs, such as the
universal term ‘soul’. Both kinds of  knowledge are based on the conclusions
which form the material basis of this science. These conclusions are considered
to be necessary truths, and knowledge of them is, according to Lutrea and
Usingen, what Aristotle meant in his remark that knowledge concerns necessary
truths (cf. Aristotle, An. Post. 1). By means of this conceptual construction
Lutrea and Usingen could maintain their nominalist conviction that there are no
universal and necessary features in extramental things themselves, and that
universality manifests itself only in the mind through universal concepts and the
necessary features predicated of them. Nonetheless, natural science consists of a
knowledge of extramental entities and universal invariances at the same time.
44 Trutfetter seems to be the first of these authors to quote Biel, which he did in a
retrospective description of a quodlibet in 1497, printed in his Summule in 1501.
There he quotes Biel’s Canonis misse expositio. See Trutfetter, Una conclusio
cum corollariis in disputatione de quolibet Erffordie A. D. 1497 posita, ed. Hans-
Ulrich Wöhler in Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter
6 (2001), 160. The reference to the Fifth Lateran Council is found in the Summa,
f. Y4r.
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Lutrea admits that the distinction between the mental and extramental object of
scientific knowledge derives from the philosophers of the via moderna. Similar
problems do not arise among philosophers of the realist via antiqua, who
consider natural science as a pursuit of knowledge of the invariable universal
features of beings  in the extramental world.45
45 Lutrea: “Utrum de anima sit scientia tanquam de obiecto proprio et adaequato
illius scientiae...unde triplex est scibile. Propinquus est quod propinquius
terminat actum assensivum ipsius intellectus ut est conclusio. Remotum est quod
remote terminat actum assensivum ipsius intellectus ut est terminus conclusionis.
Remotissimum est quod remotissime terminat actum assensivum ipsius
intellectus ut est res, quia res est extra animam, actus autem assensivus in anima
est... Sequitur quod differentia est inter scibile primum et propinquum. Res enim
bene dicitur scibile primus sed non dicitur scibile propinquus. Res dicitur scibile
primus quia primo scitur quia ipsa directe per modum obiecti scitur, sed termini
et conclusiones reflexe sciuntur. Et illa distinctio scibilis in propinquum et
remotum et remotissimum habet ortum ex via moderna. Antiqui non curant illam
distinctionem quia ipsi dicunt quod solum de illo sit scientia quod significatur
per genera et species ut de rebus universalibus. Et fundant se super hoc quia
scientia est verorum necessariorum aeternorum impossibiliter aliter se
habentium. Modo omnia illa sunt corruptibilia praeter ea qui significantur per
genera et species. Sed nos dicimus quod de omnibus rebus mundi sit scientia et
distinguimus de triplici scibile, et scientia est verorum necessariorum aeternorum
impossibiliter aliter se habentium tanquam scibilium propinquorum non autem
remotissimorum... respondetur ad quaestionem quod anima est subiectum
praesentis notitiae et de ea est scientia tanquam de scibili remoto et
remotissimo.” Ex., ff. 1r–4r; Usingen: “Utrum scientiae de anima, anima sit
proprium et adaequatum subiectum” Ex. an., ff. A2r–A4r. Similar ideas come
across in the preface of Trutfetter’s Summa. Lutrea devotes a separate, although
very short, question to the doctrine of complexe significabilia as formulated by
Gregory of Rimini and Henry of Langenstein, which he rejects, whereas Usingen
argues against the doctrine only briefly in his first question, and slightly more at
length in the opening question of his Exercitium phisicorum (Erfurt, 1507). See
“Utrum complexe significabilia sint ponenda” Lutrea, Ex., f. 14r ; Usingen, Ex.
phis., f. A3r, Ex. an., f. A2r. see also Parvulus, f. 7v. On the antiqui, see Lutrea:
“Antiqui non curant illam distinctionem, quia ipsi dicunt quod solum de illo sit
scientia quod significatur per genera et species ut de rebus universalibus.”
Lutrea, Ex., f. 1r. Usingen does not explicitly mention the rivalling view of the
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As Lutrea’s remark would suggest, a Thomist like Johannes Peyligk is
not likely to separate the object of natural science from its immutable features
and does not have to construct an equivocal concept of the object of science in
order to satisfy the diverse requirements concerning the object of natural science.
Nonetheless, even Peyligk has to explain how an object of natural science can be
an entity of the extramental world, whose existence is contingent and possesses
universal and necessary features at the same time. At the beginning of his treatise
on natural philosophy he discusses the question of whether natural science is
possible, since scientific knowledge concerns necessary and immutable truths.
His answer is that although the existence and several features of natural entities
are contingent, necessary predications can be made concerning these. The truth
of these predications even depends on the existence of singular entities of nature,
but it is important to note that scientific knowledge does not concern the
necessary truth of conclusions, but rather what the conclusions affirm of the
features of the extramental entities. Movement is a necessary feature of someone
walking, even if it is only contingently true that Socrates is walking. The contrast
with Usingen’s via moderna remains surprisingly moderate, since Peyligk also
thinks that knowledge is about extramental entities, and that the immutable part
of it consists of a propositionally explicated relation between a subject and its
predicates. However, he quotes Aquinas, who notes that “nothing is so
contingent that it would not include some necessity.”46
via antiqua.
46 Peyligk, Compendium, ff. A3r-v. See especially f. A3v: “Sed contra: scientia
est verorum perpetuorum (primo Posteriorum), res autem naturales sunt
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If the view of the extramental object of psychology was to divide
nominalists from their Thomist counterparts, another problem concerning the
object of psychology brought them together. Both defend the view that the object
of this science is the soul, in contrast to the view (supported by Albert the Great,
Giles of Rome and the Scotists) that the object would be the ensouled body. The
borderline does not in this case lie between the camps of the via antiqua and via
moderna, but rather between various authorities of the via antiqua. Therefore it
is not unnatural that Peyligk shows more interest in the topic than his colleague
Usingen in Erfurt. Peyligk’s two arguments for his view are similar to those
found in the Erfurtian exercitia. These include the defence of the idea that the
soul, and not only the soul-body composition, can be considered as the subject of
vital operations, as well as the argument based on the distinction between the
soul as a subject in which all knowledge inheres and as the subject of a particular
science of psychology. Usingen even uses literally the same distinction
subiectum inhesionis vs. attributionis as Peyligk in his response to the contrary
argument. Erasmus Friesner devotes a question to the topic of whether there can
be a science of the soul, but only briefly addresses the argument that the soul
corruptibiles quia ex contrariis compositae, ergo ipsarum nequit esse scientia.
Dicendum ad maiorem quod scientia non dicitur perpetuorum, quia extrema
ipsius conclusionis demonstratae, ut subiectum et passiones ei inesse
demonstratae, sint perpetuae, quia ut sic de his inferioribus non posset esse
scientia eo quod nullum ipsorum est perpetuum...sed dicitur scientia
perpetuorum ratione habitudinis propriae passionis ad subiectum et econtra,
quae, quia est perpetua, sufficit ad scientiam de corruptibilibus habenda.
Similiter dicatur de omnibus propositionibus necessariis, quae perpetuae
dicuntur veritatis a sola habitudine extremorum, non ab extremis. Dicente
Porphyrio: sive Socrates sit, sive non sit, semper est risibilis et homo. Regula
beati Thomae: nihil est adeo contingens, quin aliquid necessitatis includit.”
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itself cannot be the subject of  science. 47
The Scotist Jan ze Stobnicy argues that the object of this science is the
composition of soul and body, although he mentions it only as the “more
probable” view and that it is “commonly held among the Scotists.” He
introduces three arguments in favour of this position: (1) there must exist a
coherence between the object of this science and natural science in general, and
since natural science considers the moving body as such, the object of
psychology must be the ensouled body, (2) the composition is more than any of
its parts, which renders the ensouled body more suitable as the object of this
science than the soul alone, and (3) the composition, and not the soul alone, is
the proper subject of the vital operations. Argument (1) arises from the Scotist
notion of the object of natural science, which is not shared by Aquinas or
Buridan who define it as ens mobile instead of corpus mobile found in Scotus.
Therefore the nominalist and Thomist authors do not object to this particular
argument in the discussion on psychology, but rather to another related one
which states that the human intellectual soul cannot be the object of psychology,
since it is immovable. Argument (3) is identical to the first objection in Peyligk’s
discussion and is also found in the discussion of the Erfurt nominalists as noted
above.48
47 Peyligk, Compendium, ff. I5v–6r; Friesner, Cursus philosophicus, f. aaar. See
also Lutrea, Ex., f. 2r; Usingen, Ex. an., ff. A3r-v.
48 Stobnicy, Parvulus, ff. 93v–4r: “Tractatus tertius parvuli philosophiae naturalis
tribus libris de anima Aristotelis correspondens, cuius subiectum secundum
probabiliorem opinionem est corpus animatum, hoc est compositum ex corpore
et anima et non ipsa anima. Quod probatur tripliciter. Primo sic: sicut se habet
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A considerable number of pages are devoted to the first book of De
anima in the question-commentaries. After the treatment of the object of
psychology, Lutrea’s and Usingen’s exercitia discuss certain questions arising
from the first book of the De anima.49 These include the honourability and
goodness of knowledge, the dignity and difficulty of the science of psychology,
the priority of universals vs. singulars and the contribution of accidents to the
knowledge of substances. In comparison, Friesner discusses in his Thomist
commentary the question of the dignity and difficulty of psychology and of the
contribution of accidents to the knowledge of substances. He additionally
discusses two questions not found in the Erfurt commentaries: whether there are
some functions where the soul does not communicate to the body and whether
the dialectical definitions are void.50 All these themes are absent from Usingen’s
Parvulus and Compendium, as well as from Stobnicy's Parvulus, which all begin
their expositions with a definition of the soul (Stobnicy after an initial question
about the science of the soul), with Peyligk bringing into the discussion the
scientia ad scientiam, ita subiectum ad subiectum...Secundo: scientia
honorabilior inter scientias naturales debet habere subiectum honorabilius inter
omnia entia naturalia...Tertio: illud est subiectum scientiae de quo passiones
consideratae in illa scientiae primo et principaliter dicuntur...Ex quibus omnibus
concluditur, secundum hanc opinionem quam communiter tenent Scotisantes,
quod haec scientia tractat de anima, non tanquam de subiecto primo seu
adaequato, sed tanquam de principio formali subiecti primi.” Cf. Lutrea, Ex., ff.
2v–3r; Usingen Ex. an., ff. A3r-v; Friesner, Cursus philosophicus, f. aaar.
49 Here the order and titles of the questions follow Lawrence of Lindores’s
commentary. See Lawrence Moonan, ‘Lawrence of Lindores on Life in the
Living Being’, in Classica et mediaevalia 27 (1966), 371.
50 Friesner, Cursus philosophicus, ff. aaa1ra–2rb. See especially f. 2ra-b: “Utrum
aliquae operationes animae propriae quas non communicat corpori...Utrum
diffinitiones dialecticae sint cassae et vanae.”
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dignity of psychology. Trutfetter takes notice of the first book of De anima
(following the example of Georg Reisch) by discussing the ancient views of the
nature of the soul presented by Aristotle but no other topics connected to
Aristotle’s first book.51
4.2. General questions concerning the soul
At the beginning of the treatment of the second book, the Erfurt exercitia posit
the question of whether the soul is a substance in advance of the questions about
the definition of the soul. The soul is designated as a substance, since the
essential parts of the substances (form and matter) are substances in a proper
sense. According to Usingen, the quantitative parts of substances, such as head
or arm, are also called substances; Lutrea mentions only matter and form.52 The
51 T h e compendia follow the structure of Peter of Dresden’s Parvulus
philosophie naturalis, which is generally very similar to the structure of Pierre
d’Ailly’s Tractatus de anima, since both derive much of their structure from the
pseudo-Albertinian Summa naturalium. The Erfurt compendia, as well as
Dresden’s and d’Ailly’s earlier treatises, begin with a definition of the soul and
then proceed to discuss the various potencies in a fairly systematic manner. It
may be noted, though, that the later writers of the compendia do not systematize
their material to the extent that they would treat species, habits and acts
separately from the treatment of  different potencies, as did d’Ailly. Usingen
discusses passions and habits, commenting briefly on the corresponding passage
in Peter’s Parvulus, but Trutfetter devotes longer passages to passions and habits
after the treatment of various potencies, which may indicate the influence of
Pierre d’Ailly’s Tractatus. Neither of them discuss acts distinct from the
respective potencies. See Usingen, Parvulus, ff. 112v–3r; Georg Reisch,
Margarita philosophica, (1508), f. e4r; Trutfetter, Summa, ff. Gg4r–Hh4r.
52 Lutrea, Ex., f. 16v; Usingen, Ex. an., f. C5r. On Usingen’s view of substance,
see also Kärkkäinen, ‘On the Semantics’, 248–50.
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discussion of the soul’s definition53 and of the plurality of forms54 as well as the
distinction of potencies55 takes place in all the expositions. The answer to these
follow the position of the Buridanian via moderna: there is only one substantial
form in a human being, which is the intellectual soul and there is no real
distinction between its potencies, nor between the soul and its potencies.56
The Erfurt commentaries also describe competing positions like those of
the Thomists or Scotists. The comparison between the discussion on the
distinction between the soul’s potencies in Usingen’s Parvulus and Peyligk’s
Compendium shows that the description of the Thomist position was understood
in a similar way by both authors, but the arguments were chosen in a different
manner. This might well be  due to the process of abbreviation, since in the
compendia it was not possible to present the various arguments
comprehensively. Yet there seem to be more obvious  reasons. Even if both
authors refer to Aquinas’ main proof in the Summa theologiae (I q. 77 a. 1 co.) in
53 Lutrea, Ex., ff. 17v–20v; Usingen, Parvulus, ff. 80v–2r; Ex. an., ff. C6r-D2v;
Comp., f. K3r-v; Trutfetter, Summa, ff. X4v-6v.
54 Lutrea Ex., f. 21r; Usingen, Parvulus, f. 88r; Ex. an., f. D3v; Comp., f. K3r;
Trutfetter, Summa, f. Y1v. On this subject in Usingen, see Lalla, Secundum, 169–
80.
55 Lutrea, Ex., ff. 23r–6r; Usingen, Parvulus, ff. 82v–4v; Ex. an., ff. E1v-E5r;
Comp., f. K4r; Trutfetter, Summa, ff. Y1r; X3r-4r.
56 See for example: Lutrea, Ex., f. 21v: “Respondetur ad questionem, quod in uno
homine est tamen una forma substantialis et non plures, quae claudit in se omnes
perfectiones omnium inferiorum formarum. Illa responsio est beati Thomae,
Marsilii, Byridani, Aristotelis in hoc secundo De anima”; f. 23v: “Respondetur
quod potentiae animae sunt tantum quinque, nec ab anima nec inter se realiter
distinctae.”
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the description of the Thomist position, their sources vary when they present
further arguments. The choice of sources is  related to their general aim to
present and defend their own school’s positions. In his description of the
Thomist position Usingen first mentions all the arguments in favour of this
position, which Gregory of Rimini also mentions in his discussion of Aquinas’
position, and adds some others which are for the most part also found in
Rimini’s same question with refutations. However, he mentions Rimini only
when discussing the opinion of the via moderna and the counter-arguments
against the Thomist position.57 Contrarily, Peyligk refers to a wider range of
works by Aquinas and Giles of Rome, and despite the brevity of the treatment
presents arguments not found in Usingen, such as: “Nothing except God operates
through his substance”.58 Therefore it seems clear that in the Parvulus Usingen is
not involved in an argument against contemporary Thomists, but rather
reproduces the traditional argumentation against Aquinas from his immediate
sources.
On the question of whether there exist other substantial forms besides the
intellectual soul in human beings, the Erfurtian via moderna contradicts not the
Thomist but the Scotist view. The Scotist position, which affirms the existence of
a separate form of corporeity, is described in similar terms in Usingen’s and
57 Usingen, Parvulus, ff. 82v–4v ; Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum et
secundum Sententiarum, 2 sent d 16 et 17 q 3, ed. Trapp (Berlin, 1979), 355–6;
369–70. On Usingen’s view of the distinction between the soul’s potencies, see
Lalla, Secundum, 205–15.
58 Peyligk, Comp., ff. K1v–K2v.
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Stobnicy’s parvuli. It is perhaps worth noting that whereas Usingen discusses the
question concerning the plurality of forms, Stobnicy formulates the question to
ask whether there are three distinct souls. Consequently, Usingen refutes the
Scotist view as well as that of Ockham, both of which disagree with his own
Buridanian view (and, by the way, the Thomist view as well). Stobnicy stresses
that his position, which posits only one soul, agrees with almost all the writers
except Ockham “and his followers”, which in fact does not include Usingen’s
Buridanian view. Only incidentally does he mention the originality of the Scotist
position, which admits the existence of a separate form of corporeity. It looks
very likely that the choice of question makes both writers’ own positions appear
more widely accepted.59 Usingen’s choice of arguments for and against the
Scotist view reveals again his debt to the authority of Gregory of Rimini. Both
arguments for the view and their refutations date back to Gregory’s treatment of
the question. Apart from the reference to Christ’s body in the grave, the
arguments are not found in Stobnicy’s Parvulus. Again, Usingen’s discussion is
focused on reaffirming the position of the via moderna, not on arguments with
his contemporaries.60 
The two questions discussed above find a far more comprehensive
treatment in the exercitia of Lutrea and Usingen. One could expect that the views
of the rivalling schools might also be treated in a more adequate manner than in
59 Usingen, Parvulus, ff. 86r–6r; Stobnicy, Parvulus, f. 96r–v.
60 Usingen, Parvulus, ff. 86r–v; 87v–8r; Stobnicy, Parvulus, f. 96v. See also
Lalla, Secundum, 174–5.
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Usingen’s Parvulus. Concerning the question of the plurality of substantial
forms both Lutrea and Usingen list several more views, but the most important
are the three also mentioned in the Parvulus. The remaining ones do not reflect
any contemporaneous positions: they include three historical positions
(Anaxagoras, Plato and Averroës) and two views discussed by Gregory of
Rimini (John of Jandun and William of Auvergne). Furthermore, the discussion
is not focused on contemporary arguments.61 The same applies to the question of
the distinction between the soul’s powers, which in the argumentation against the
Thomist position does not significantly differ from Usingen’s Parvulus.62
Following these preliminary questions some differences appear between
the themes discussed in the various types of expositions. The Erfurt exercitia
discuss the question common in the Buridanian tradition of whether the soul is
present as a whole in every part of the body.63 Usingen also has another question,
apparently taken from Lawrence of Lindores’s De anima, namely “Whether
every quantitative part of an animal is animal”.64 Lutrea discusses the same topic
in his question concerning the soul’s presence in the body. Both affirm that
quantitative parts fulfil the definition of an animal and therefore they are animal.
Usingen notes, though, that the term ‘animal’ is then taken in an absolute sense
61 Lutrea, Ex., f. 21r-v; Usingen, Ex. an., f. D3r-v. See also Gregory of Rimini,
Lectura 2 dist 16 et 17 q 2, ed. Trapp 332, 24–30. On Usingen’s discussion, see
Lalla, Secundum, 177–180.
62 Lutrea, Ex., ff. 23r–24v; Usingen, Ex. an., ff. E1r–E4r. On Usingen, see Lalla,
Secundum, 207–15.
63 Lutrea, Ex., ff. 26r–8r; Usingen, Ex. an., ff. E5r–6v.
64 See the table of questions in Lawrence Moonan, Lawrence of Lindores, 371. 
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as signifying the nature rather than an individual.65 
I n h i s compendia Usingen proceeds directly from the questions
concerning the soul’s definition and division of the potencies to those concerning
the vegetative potency. In the corresponding passage of his Summa, Trutfetter
discusses several themes concerning the intellectual and sensitive souls, such as
opinions on their nature and origin. He especially emphasizes the Catholic
Christian view of the intellectual soul, which is described in the form of
doctrinal sentences.66 Then he also takes up both of the questions discussed by
Usingen concerning the presence of the intellectual soul in the body, and
presents a rather extensive digression into the problem of individuation while
discussing the latter question.67 Only then does he return to ask the final
questions concerning the distinction of the potencies. At the end of the chapter
he writes a remark for the theologians who would question the importance of the
study of such matters. There he refers to the traditional analogy between  the
human soul and the Holy Trinity, where the different potencies have been
understood to stand for the different persons of the Trinity.68
The vegetative soul is hardly discussed in the exercitia. Lutrea devotes to
it only one question, which asks about the justification of the division between
65 Usingen, Ex. an., ff. E6v-F1v. On the question, see Kärkkäinen, ’On
Semantics’.
66 See  Pekka Kärkkäinen, ‘Theology, Philosophy and Immortality of the Soul in
the Late Via Moderna of Erfurt’, Vivarium 43 (2005), 337–60.
67 See Kärkkäinen, ‘Nature and Individual’.
68 Summa, X4r. On the context of Trutfetter’s remark, see Pekka Kärkkäinen,
‘Interpretations of Psychological Analogy from Aquinas to Biel’, in Trinitarian
Theology in the Medieval West  ed. P. Kärkkäinen (Helsinki, 2007), 256–79.
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the three nutritive potencies.69 Usingen adds in his Exercitium  the question of
whether the generation of a being like oneself is a natural operation of a living
being.70 As well, in the compendia the treatment of the vegetative soul is
relatively short. Usingen presents in the Parvulus two questions concerning the
augmentative potency.71
5. The legacy of Erfurtian psychology in Wittenberg?
Little is known about the relevance of the psychology of the via moderna
regarding later developments in psychology. This applies in particular to the
psychology of the Erfurtians. Johann Eck is one of the authors who has
acknowledged his debt to Trutfetter. How much this applies to his psychology
has not been studied.72 Another author, whose influence on later psychology was
particularly important, also mentions Trutfetter’s natural philosophy in a
69 Ex., ff. 29v-30v.
70 Ex. an., ff. F1v-F4v. See also Buridan, Quaestiones de anima, De prima
lectura (=QDA1), ed. B. Patar in Patar, Le traité de l’âme de Jean Buridan.
Philosophes médiévaux 29 (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1991), 288–92). On the dubious
authenticity of the edited text see J.M.M.H Thijssen, ‘Late-Medieval Natural
Philosophy: Some Recent Trends in Scholarship’, Recherches de Théologie et
Philosophie Médievales 67 (2000), 190.
71 “Utrum quaelibet pars aucti augeatur” and “Utrum in qualibet species
quantorum dabilis sit maxima, similiter minima quantitas, sub qua forma potest
stare in materia.” Usingen, Parvulus, ff. 90v–1r. Usingen discusses the latter
question in the Exercitium phisicorum, E6r–F2r. See also Trutfetter, Summa, f.
Dd3r.
72 Arno Seifert, Logik zwischen Scholastik und Humanismus (München, 1978),
17–8.
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favourable manner. In the preface to his Commentarius de anima from 1540,
Philipp Melanchthon recommends his students to study Trutfetter, in addition to
similar works from Juan Luis Vives and Johann Bernhardi of Feldkirch (also
known as Johannes Velcurio).73 The latter was Melanchthon’s colleague in
Wittenberg before his early death in 1534, and the work Melanchthon refers to is
probably the psychological part of his natural philosophy, which was first
published posthumously in 1537 and subsequently became a rather popular
textbook through several reprints. Melanchthon’s remark would thus encourage
us to compare Trutfetter and other Erfurtians with the psychology of the
Wittenbergians Bernhardi and Melanchthon himself.
If continuity between the Erfurtians and Wittenbergians were to be
observed, would that further imply that natural philosophy in Wittenberg
transmitted some ideas which originated from the via moderna into early modern
natural philosophy? This seems to be true at least to some degree. Therefore it is
important to determine whether the alleged continuities are also related to
specific positions of the via moderna and not merely to common scholastic
views.74 
73 Philipp Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima (Wittenberg, 1540), f. a5r, see
also Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, 1995),
86.
74 The full implications of such a transmission of ideas would require a thorough
study of the history of the reception of Melanchthon’s and Bernhardi’s
psychological ideas. For present purposes it is worth mentioning that Bernhardi’s
definition of the rational soul and the summary of its powers was quoted
(without mentioning the source) even as late as 1621 by Robert Burton in his
Anatomy of Melancholy, 1.1.2.9 ed. T. C. Faulkner, N. K. Kiessling and R. L.
Blair, vol. 1. (Oxford, 1989), 157, 24–35. See also J. B. Bamborough’s
commentary in Burton, Anatomy, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1998), 186; 192.
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Despite the more consciously Humanist style of the Wittenbergians,
some similarities with Erfurtian psychology can actually be found, even
concerning the themes discussed above. According to Johann Bernhardi, the
subject of psychology is the soul itself.75  Furthermore, he states that there is
only one soul in a human being, and that it is rational and responsible for sensory
and vegetative functions  (fungentem officiis quoque sensitivae ac vegetativae
animae);76 in a similar way, the powers of the rational soul, intellect and will, are
not essentially distinct, but distinguished only with respect to their functions.77
These formulations point to an affinity with the position of the Erfurtian via
moderna, although Bernhardi does not discuss in detail the distinction between
different kinds of souls or the soul’s powers. 
Melanchthon mentions in his Commentarius de anima from 1540 the
discussion of the unity of the human soul. He finds it acceptable to talk of three
souls in a human being and even mentions Ockham as an example of such a
position. Melanchthon’s view arises from his interpretation of the Aristotelian
entelekheia as a principle of bodily movements, which according to him is only
applicable to the sensory and not the rational soul. In his view, therefore, an
75 I refer to Johann Bernhardi of Feldkirch’s, Commentarii in universam
physicam Aristotelis, IV, praefatio 6 (Tübingen, 1544, first printing in Erfurt,
1537/38), f. 171r, which contradicts the Scotist view, but is in agreement with
the Thomist view, as discussed above. Cf. also the Scotist position of Pierre
Tartaret, Expositio super tota philosophia naturali nec non Metaphysica
Aristotelis cum textu (Lyon 1498/99), fol. 107v. Tartaret was used in the teaching
of natural philosophy in Wittenberg before the Reformation. See Kusukawa,
Transformation, 50.
76 Bernhardi, Commentarii, IV.3.1, f. 199r.
77 Bernhardi, Commentarii, IV.18.2, f. 230r-v.
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essential distinction is made between sensory and rational souls. The former is
an Aristotelian entelekheia, which is a form of the body and corruptible like all
forms of matter. The rational soul is, on the other hand, an immortal spiritual
substance, which forms, together with the body, the substance of a human being.
Although Melanchthon formulates his position after a discussion on ancient
views such as Aristotle’s and Galen’s, it is interesting to note that he finds
support for his view in Ockham, the venerabilis inceptor of the via moderna.78
These examples show that at least in Bernhardi there is a tendency
towards the type of psychology found in Erfurt. This impression is confirmed by
the general outline of his treatise, which follows more or less the outline of
Pierre d’Ailly’s Tractatus de anima or the psychological part of Trutfetter’s
Summa in totam physicen. In addition, concerning the question of the
multiplicity of souls, Bernhardi presents a position similar to the Erfurtians,
although this was shared by other schools as well. Contrarily, Melanchthon
actually disagrees with the Erfurtians who reject Ockham’s position.79 However,
the omission of detailed questions makes it extremely difficult to relate
Bernhardi’s  or Melanchthon’s treatises to different scholastic schools. Still,
given the examples above, this looks like a possibly rewarding task for future
research.
6. Conclusions
78 Melanchthon, Commentarius, f. 15r–6v.
79 See, for example, Trutfetter, Summa, f. Y2r.
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The Erfurtian authors discussed above seem to have a rather solid identity as
philosophers of the via moderna. In the various forms of their expositions they
reveal a rather uniform stance concerning doctrinal issues. Their positions are
largely based on the tradition of the via moderna going back to the early
fifteenth century, and their argumentation is deeply bound to the problems
arising from this school’s position. Comparisons with concurrent Thomist and
Scotist sources show that the Erfurtians describe the positions of other schools in
an appropriate manner, although the arguments for and against these positions
are often borrowed from the authorities of their own school rather than from
contemporaneous discussion.
